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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXII DECEMBER, 1936 Number 1
CORPORATE POLICY UNDER THE SURTAX ON
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS
CHRISTIAN B. PEPERt
In its present stage the surtax on undistributed corporate
profits' presents problems of a nature chiefly strategic. In view
of its legislative history2 it is not surprising that a considerable
portion of the Act is devoted not so much to the taxing of undis-
tributed earnings as to the offering of inducements to their dis-
tribution. The Act, in effect, urges a rule of corporate conduct.
Thus the problem of how best to conform to this rule and avoid
the penalties incident to deflection becomes of first importance
to the corporate taxpayer. It is the purpose of this article to
sketch and evaluate the various avenues of conformance indi-
cated by the Act. A study thus concerned with the dynamics of
proposed corporate action will not deal exclusively with the legal
merits of debatable issues, but will also stop to point out what
types of action are more likely than not to involve the taxpayer
in these legally imponderable situations; for the avoidance of
such constitutes the most immediately problem in corporate
strategy.
The charting of a plan of conformance is rendered complex
by the presence of a number of complicating elements. Upon the
normal difficulties of statutory construction are superimposed
problems of constitutional law. Distributions which appear most
f Member, St. Louis, Missouri Bar. Sterling Fellow, 1935-1936.
1. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 740, 74th Cong. 2nd Sess., 26 U. S.
C. A. (Supp. 1936) sees. 14, 26, 27. Hereafter the Act will be referred to
only by section numbers.
* Minority Views of Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 12395, 74th
Cong. 2nd Sess. (1936); Report of Senate. Committee on Finance on H. R.
12'95, 74th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1936). And for a survey of earlier legislative
adumbrations of the Act see, Graham, The Undistributed Profits Tax and
the Investor (1936) 46 Yale L. J. 1, at 10.
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safely to conform to the legal and constitutional requirements of
the Act may be rendered undesirable by considerations of sound
or practical corporate finance. Normally the taxpayer's sole an-
tagonist is the government; yet here, inasmuch as the corpora-
tion is given credit only for distributions taxable in the hands
of the shareholder, it may be confronted with the situation in
which a distribution encouraged by the taxing authorities, is
established by a shareholder not to constitute taxable income
in his hands. Over facile encouragement by the taxing authori-
ties is not the least, then, of the difficulties inherent in making
proper distributions.
This study will be chiefly directed to an evaluation of the
credits provided by the Act whereby a corporation normally sub-
ject to the undistributed profits tax may avoid its incidence.,
These credits fall broadly into two categories. (1) In the first
group are embraced credits based upon contractual inability of
the corporation to distribute its income. These present problems
of a more conventional nature since they depend upon no future
action of the taxpayer. Here the problem is almost entirely one
of statutory construction. (2) The second type of credit depends
upon the making of distributions which constitute taxable in-
come in the hands of shareholders. Here the center of inquiry
must be shifted from statutory construction to constitutional
law; for these provisions of the Act are stretched upon a con-
stitutional framework the nature of which can only be ascer-
tained by reference to a considerable body of judicial definitions.
I. CREDITS BASED UPON CONTIAACTUAL INABILITY TO
MAKE DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Prohibitions Upon Dividends
Credit is given for amounts which cannot be distributed with-
out "violating a provision of a written contract executed by the
corporation prior to May 1, 1936, which provision expressly
3. Exempted from the surtax provisions of the 1936 Act are:
"(1) Banks as defined in section 104.
(2) Domestice corporations which for any portion of the taxable year
are in bankruptcy under the laws of the United States, or are
insolvent and in receivership in any court of the United States or
of any State, Territory or the District of Columbia.
(3) Insurance companies subject to the tax imposed under section
201, 204, or 207.
(4) Foreign corporations.
(5) Corporations which, by reason of deriving a large partion of their
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/3
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deals with the payment of dividends.' 4 The careful phraseology
of this section severely limits its availability for general use. Its
scope is further restricted by the interpretations rendered by
the Treasury department.5 For the most part these interpreta-
tions are directed toward a rigid insistence upon the letter of
the statute. Thus if distributions can be made in one form but
not in another, without violating contractual inhibitions, or at
one time during the current year and not at another time, the
credit will not be allowed. And the amount of credit is further
restricted by provision that earnings accumulated prior to the
current year are to be included in the computation of the amounts
which can be distributed without violating a contract.7 The re-
quirement that dividends be expressly mentioned renders un-
available such common covenants as those providing that, while
bonds are outstanding, corporate assets shall not be reduced be-
low a specified amount.8 Only such indentures as expressly de-
clare that no dividends shall be paid unless a current asset ratio
is preserved or that some similar requirement is met, would be
able to fall under the credit. More uncertainty is centered about
gross income from sources within a possession of the United
States, are entitled to the benefits of section 251.
(6) Corporations organized under the China Trade Act, 1922.
(7) Joint Stock Land Banks organized under the Federal Farm Loan
Act as amended." Sec. 14 (d).
4. Sec. 26 (c) (1). It is further provided that "If a corporation would
be entitled to a credit under this paragraph because of a contract provision
and also to one or more credits because of other contract provisions, only
the largest of such credits shall be allowed, and for such purpose if two or
more credits are equal in amount only one shall be taken into account."
5. 70 Treas. Dec. No. 7 (Int. Rev. 4674, XV Int. Rev. Bull., No. 32 Regu-
lations (1936) Art. 26-3(a). Hereafter the Regulations will be referred to
by Articles.
6. Art. 26-3(b).
7. Ibid. As an example is given the case of a corporation which has exe-
cuted an indenture requiring it to set aside earnings and profits sufficient to
retire 10% of outstanding bonds annually before any dividends can be paid
on the stock. If the corporation has on hand earnings and profits of prior
years it will be deemed to be able to apply these toward the sinking fund
payments. Art 26-3(b) Example 1. And see ibid. Example 2. It has been
argued that the Act intended only current income to be taken into account
in determining whether a distribution would violate such contractual inhibi-
tions. Hendricks, The Surtax on Undistributed Profits of Corporations
(1936) 46 Yale L. J. 19, at 27, 28.
8. "The requirement * * * is not met in case (1) a corporation is merely
required to set aside periodically, a sum to retire its bonds, or (2) the con-
tract merely provides that while its bonds are outstanding the current as-
sets shall not be reduced below a specified amount." Art. 26-3 (b). For the
effect upon the normal corporate indenture see, Wall Street Journal (Aug.
10, 1936) p. 1, col. 6.
19361
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the ruling that the charter of a corporation does not constitute
a contract within the meaning of the Act., Such an interpreta-
tion would foreclose the only potential avenue of escape pro-
vided in the Act for a corporation which began the taxable year
with an operating deficit, which made earnings during the tax-
able year, and which is prohibited from paying out such by a
state statute prohibiting distributions which result in an impair-
ment of capital. 1° A charter expressly subjecting the corpora-
tion to present and future state laws relating to corporations
might be held to include as one of its terms a statutory prohi-
bition on distributions. In technical legal contemplation such a
charter is a contract with the state.11 On the other hand the
trend of decisions, while still referring to the charter as a con-
tract with the state, is to regard the relation between the cor-
poration and the state as one primarily of status.12 Accordingly
the inclusion of statutory provisions within the meaning of the
term "contract" demands a somewhat tenuous and legalistic in-
terpretative tour de force. The Treasury interpretations unfor-
tunately appear better grounded. Obviously no corporate tax-
payer can afford to predicate an action upon the possibility of
error in this interpretation. It is to be regretted that express
provision was not made in the Act for such a situation.
This restrictive interpretation of the term "contract," however,
possesses less validity when applied to the relations between the
corporation and its shareholders. Thus a covenant in the cor-
porate charter for a preferred stock sinking fund which speci-
fically limited the payment of common dividends, while certain
amounts of preferred remained outstanding, would seem within
the meaning of the Act.
Such agreements may be embodied in a charter for conveni-
ence; they hold a separable contractual status regardless of the
9. Art. 26-3(a).
10. The hardship imposed by this ruling is illustrated by the dilemma in
which the International Paper & Power Co. appears to be placed. Wall St.
Journal (Aug. 25, 1936) p. 6, col. 1.
11. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819)
Miller v. New York, 15 Wall. 478 (1873).
12. Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591, 31 S. Ct. 122, 54 L. ed. 1163 (1910),
and cases cited therein at 599; Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co., 105 U.
S. 13, 26 L. ed. 961 (1882) ; Schmidt, Constitutional Limitations Upon Legis-
lative Power to Alter Incidents of the Shareholder's Status in Private Cor-
porations (1935) 21 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 12.
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document in which embodied.13 It is likely that the Treasury rul-
ing implies a distinction between the provisions of a charter
which define the relations between the corporation and the
state, and contracts between the corporation and a preferred
stockholder which fortuitously happen to be included in the
former.
Whether an indenture executed by a parent company having
to do with profits and dividends on a consolidated basis would
be considered a contract "executed" by its subsidiary, is not cer-
tain but on principle the answer would appear to be in the nega-
tive. Until the matter is clarified, intercorporate relations of
this type may suffer from dislocations to such an extent as to
add a further spur to reorganization.14
B. Sinking Fund Provisions
Credit is given for "an amount equal to the portion of the
earnings and profits of the taxable year which is required (by a
provision of a written contract executed by the corporation prior
to May 1, 1936, which provision expressly deals with the disposi-
tion of earnings and profits of the taxable year) to be paid with-
in the taxable year in discharge of a debt, to the extent that such
amount has been so paid or set aside.'' 15 It may be seen that a
nice phraseology likewise characterizes this section. The same
restrictive adherence to the letter appears in the Regulations.16
According to the Regulations the requirements of the section are
not met if the sinking fund agreement merely requires the cor-
poration to retire a certain percentage of such bonds annually
or to maintain a fund adequate to retire such bonds on maturity,
or to pay into the fund specified sums per unit of lumber cut, or
coal mined, or an amount equal to a percentage of gross sales or
gross income."?
13. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. C.
D. R. I., 1929); and cases supra, note 12.
14. An opposite pull, however, is exerted by the difficulties put in the
way of new sinking funds by sec. 26(c) (2), infra. p. 6; and by the im-
ponderabilities of sec. 27(f), infra p. 23. A similar problem would be pre-
sented by an indenture which used consolidated figures as a yardstick; such
may forbid dividend declarations unless a two to one consolidated current
asset ratio is preserved. Difficulties would arise if one company had this
ratio, another did not. See Seidman, Undistributed Profits Tax Problems(1936) 14 T. M. 453.
15. See. 26(c) (2).
16. Art. 26-3.
17, Art. 26-3 (c). It has been argued that dispositions of "gross income"
1936]
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The requirement that the percentage of earnings and profits
be actually set aside during the current year may conflict with
such indentures as allow a period after the year's close for deter-
mination of the year's profits and prescribe that the appropria-
tion be made upon such a determination.1 8
Ruling has been made that the term "debt" does not include
an obligation to a shareholder as such; thus preferred stock sink-
ing funds are excluded from the benefit of the section. 10 Such
an interpretation results easily from the well-defined legal char-
acteristics of the usual preferred issue.20 Difficulties, however,
may more readily surround the status of hybrid types of securi-
ties, the legal nature of which are more protean.
21
The terminology of the statute appears to justify the conclu-
sion drawn by the Regulations that refunding operations entered
into after April 30, 1936, do not receive the protection of the
credit.22 This is one of the most widely, and perhaps justifiably,
criticized sections of the Act. It requires careful attention by
all corporations weighing the factors involved in proposed refi-
nancing and reorganization schemes. Unless modified, the sec-
tion may have a tendency to act as a fiscal brake upon corporate
debt readjustments. 23
or "gross sales" in .effect might be considered "expressly to deal" with at
least a prtion of the earnings and profits of the taxable year. Hendricks,
The Surtax on Undistributed Profits of Corporations (1936) 46 Yale L. J.
19, at 29. The Treasury ruling, however, appears justifiable. It is further
provided that contractual provisions dealing with earnings and profits "in
terms of 'net income', 'net earnings', or 'net profits'" fall within the scope
of the statute. Art. 26-3(c).
18. Supra, note 15. See Seidman, Undistributed Profits Tax Problems
(1936) 14 T. M. 453 for a discussion of this problem.
19. Art. 26-3(c).
20. See Atlantic City Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 152, 156,
53 S. Ct. 383, 77 L. ed. 667 (1933); In re Culbertson's, 54 F. (2d) 753
(C. C. A. 9, 1932) ; Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves, 8 F. (2d)
716 (C. C. A. 2, 1925); Yoakum v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.
(2d) 533 (D. C. D. R. I., 1929).
21. Income bonds, participating operation certificates, participating bond-
holders, irredeemable bonds, trade certificates, represent some of the prod-
ucts of legal and financial ingenuity which may prove embarrassing in the
present situation. For a holding as to the nature of participating operation
certificates see In re Hawkeye Oil Co., 19 F. (2d) 151 (D. C. D. Del. 1927) ;
U. S. & Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas & Oil Service Co., 19 F. (2d)
624 (D. C. W. D. Pa., 1924). For an able general discussion of these types
see Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves, 8 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 2,
1925) ; Comment Status of Holders of Hybrid Securities: Stockholders or
Creditors? (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 907.
22. Art. 26-3 (c).
23. See Wall Street Journal (Sept. 10, 1936) p. 1, col. 6; (Oct. 22, 1936)
p. 1, col. 6.
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The scope of credits is further curtailed by the provision that
where credit may be had both under the restrictions of dividends
clause and under the sinking fund clause, only the greater shall
be counted. 24
In general, however, it may be observed that the restrictive
provisions of this section will not press upon the average cor-
poration as severely as do those of See. 26 (c) (1) ; for in cases
where the sinking fund represents the application of sums re-
served for depreciation and deducted from earnings before cal-
culating the net corporate income subject to tax, the necessity
of invoking the section will be avoided.25
It can be seen that exemptions based upon contractual inabil-
ity to distribute income are narrowly conceived and restrictedly
interpreted so as to serve only a limited number of situations.
Added to this narrowness of scope are the individual problems
of interpretation noted above, which ultimately may be resolved
only in litigation. Consequently, rather than rely upon these ex-
emptions it is advisable for the corporate taxpayer to seek relief
under the category of dividends paid credits. Where the corpo-
ration is prevented by contract or law from distributing a por-
tion of its earnings, it prudently should hedge against the possi-
bility of such being entirely disallowed as credits, by distributing
the remainder of its income in accordance with the more liberal
dividends paid provisions, to be discussed below. Where the en-
tirety of its income is frozen by contractual or legal obstacles,
the taxpayer stands in a more serious dilemma; it is neither
certain of obtaining exemptions in its present condition, nor able
to ensure such by positive action. In such a case the only anti-
dote would appear to consist in removing the obstacles to distri-
bution; in the cases of capital deficits the knot occasionally may
be cut by a shifting of book entries.23 Corporate liquidations and
reorganizations may also relieve the difficulty; there is, however,
in the resort to such expedients, the danger of falling under
an even more hazardous and uncharted section of the Act.27
24. See. 26(c) (3).
25. See Graham, The Undistributed Profits Tax and the Investor (1936)
46 Yale L. J. 1, at 13.
26. i. e. by such dubious expedients as writing up tangible assets, reduc-
ing certain reserves. The reduction of capital stick is a more respectable
device. In such cases, however, the cure might be more harmful than the
malady. See Prentice-Hall 1936 Federal Tax Service Vol. I, para. 34.
27. Infra p. 23.
1936]
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These credits, then, contain serious lacunae; they create, in
effect, a taxable limbo in which a corporation which is unable to
comply with the rule of conduct urged by the Act suffers an
unavoidable penalty.28 It is to be hoped that revisions of the law
will extend the scope of exemptions to include all bona fide cases
where the taxpayer is legally or contractually unable to declare
out earnings in dividends. There is some indication that this
revision is not far away.29
II. DIVIDENDS PAID CREDITS
In sharp contrast to the credits dealt with above are those
allowed under this head. Here we are dealing with what are in
effect stimuli to a desired cause of action. Difficulties arise not
so much from a restrictive statutory and administrative policy
as from what may prove in some cases to be a too facile invita-
tion to act. The law provides for a number of dividend policies
whereby a corporation may avoid the incidence of the tax; a few
such policies are sketched by the Act and regulations; others may
be deduced from the broad and liberal terminology employed by
the statute. All credits, however, are made expressly subject to
the requirement that the distribution constitute taxable income
in the hands of the distributee.30 Thus the Act, in a manner per-
haps unique to American jurisprudence, embodies by reference
a great mass of case law dealing with the definition of the mean-
ing of "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment. Thus in
place of the niceties of statutory interpretation we are confronted
with the less predictable niceties of constitutional law. A study
of this constitutional background is necessary to an evaluation
of the dividend choices open to the corporate taxpayer. Upon
such a background the laws and regulations are projected. This
background becomes particularly pertinent in the case of stock
28. Consult Wall Street Journal (Aug. 25, 1936) p. 6, col. 1; (Aug. 10,
1936) p. 1, col. 6.
29. Wall Street Journal (Oct. 22, 1936).
30. See. 27(h) "If any part of a distribution (including stock dividends
and stock rights) is not a taxable dividend in the hands of such of the
shareholders as are subject to taxation under this title for the period in
which the distribution is made, no dividends paid credit shall be allowed
with respect to such part." Sec. 115 (f) (1) provides "A distribution made
by c corporation to its shareholders in its stock or in rights to acquire the
stock shall not be treated as a dividend to the extent that it does not consti-
tute income to the shareholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amend-
men to the Constitution." For a delimitation of taxable income, see Sec.
115(a); (b); (c); (d); (e); (f); Art. 27-8.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/3
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dividends proper-a type which will appear most attractive to
corporations which desire to capitalize and retain their current
earnings.
A. Stock Dividends
Constitutional inhibitions upon the taxability of stock divi-
dends arose early in the history of the amendment when the
Court, in the case of Eisner v. Macomber32 (against Holmes' suc-
cinct objection that the purpose of the amendment had been to
get rid of such "nice questions,")-3 held that an operation,
whereby a corporate surplus was transferred to capital and dis-
tribution thereof made by issuing new common stock as a divi-
dend upon the outstanding common, did not constitute taxable
income within the meaning of the Amendment. The decision was
based chiefly upon the reasoning that (1) the transaction was a
mere bookkeeping device whereby the corporation relinquished
nothing and the stockholder gained nothing for his separate use,
and that (2) the pre-existing proportionate interests of the
stockholder were in no wise altered by the distribution; for im-
mediately following the dividend he held precisely the same
interests in the corporate assets as before; the evidences of his
ownership had been multiplied, their sum remained constant.3 4
Certain limitations upon the rule were hinted at in the majority
opinion, but, with occasional exceptions, were subsequently ig-
nored or overlooking by the Treasury Department and lower
courts; and for a period of many years the taxability of all stock
dividends was held suspect.-5 Close upon Eisner v. Macomber,
however, followed a series of Supreme Court decisions which
gave greater effect to the qualifications of the rule than to the
:1. See Wall Street Journal (Oct. 22, 1936 p. 1, col. 6, p. 2, col. 6 (Grey-
hound Corp.); (Aug. 10, 1936) p. 1, col. 6; 143 Comm. & Fin. Chron. 2201,
2669 (Caterpillar Tractor); 143 Comm. & Fin. Chron. 2360 (Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry.).
32. 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189, 64 L. ed. 521 (1920).
33. Ibid. at 220.
34. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Magill, Realization of In-
comie Through Corporate Distributions (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 519; Magill,
Taxable Income (1936) at 29 ff. In general consult Seligman, Effects of the
Stock Dividend Decision (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 313; Maggs, Computation
of Income (1924) 13 Calif. L. Rev. 13; Note, Taxability of Stock Dividends
as Income (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 1122; Powell, Income from Corporate
Dividends (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 363.
35. See 26 U. S. C. A. see. 115 (f) (1934): "A stock dividend shall not
be subject to tax." And Regs. 86 (1934 Act) Art. 115-7, 115-8. And see
cases and rulings cited in notes 48, 88, 96, 97, infra.
19361
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rule itself. These, for the most part, dealt with exchanges in
connection with reorganizations, then taxable30 A common
stockholder who was given new common in his reorganized com-
pany was held to have received a taxable change in his propor-
tionate interest by reason of the fact that the new corporate
charter was obtained in a different state from that of the orig-
inal incorporation, and hence was subject to different corpora-
tion laws which gave different legal attributes to the securities. 7
And the fact that the new corporation had a greater capitaliza-
tion than the old was held to create a possibility of new interests
entering the picture-and thus to alter the old shareholder's pro-
portionate interest.88 These holdings indicated a readiness on the
part of the Court to give effect to even slight alterations of pro-
portionate balance. On the other hand it had already held that
dividends in the stock of a different corporation constituted a
severance of assets from the declaring corporation.,, This rule
was reiterated in the Pipe Line decisions which followed Eisner
v. Macomber." The progress toward a liberalization of the
Eisner rule, however, was not constant; the case of Weiss v.
Steam,r 4 1 decided as late as 1924, serves as a warning that the
former decision has been distinguished but not overruled. In
May of the present year the Supreme Court, in Koshland v. Hel-
vering42 took occasion to clarify its stand upon stock dividends
apart from corporate reorganization. The taxpayer was the
holder of 7% non-voting cumulative preferred, upon which divi-
dends were payable, at the option of the corporation, in either
cash or common stock. During the years 1925 to 1928 dividends
were paid in common shares. In 1930 the preferred stock was
redeemed. In computing gain the commissioner treated the com-
36. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 42 S. Ct. 63, 66 L. ed. 180
(1921); Rockefeller v. U. S., 257 U. S. 176, 42 S. Ct. 68, 66 L. ed. 186
(1921); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134, 43 S. Ct. 495, 67 L. ed. 906
(1923) ; Marr. v. United States, 268 U. S. 536, 45 S. Ct. 575, 69 L. ed.
1079 (1925).
37. United States v. Phellis, supra, note 36; Mart v. United States,
supra, note 36.
38. United States v. Phellis, supra, note 36; Marr v. United States,
supra, note 36; and consult Magill, Taxable Income (1936) at 52 ff.
39. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347, 38 S. Ct. 546, 62 L. ed. 1152 (1918).
40. Rockefeller v. United States, supra, note 36; Cullinan v. Walkei,
supra, note 36.
41. 265 U. S. 242, 44 S. Ct. 490, 68 L. ed. 1001 (1924)
42. 56 S. Ct. 767, 80 L. ed. 845 (May 18, 1936).
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mon dividends as non-taxable distributions of capital and allo-
cated to them a proportionate part of the cost of the preferred
stock, thus reducing the cost basis of the preferred. It was held
that the common dividends constituted income and could not be
treated as returns of capital. The Court pointed out that Eisner
v. Macomber "affected only the taxation of dividends declared in
the same stock as that presently held by the taxpayer" ;43 refer-
ence was made to the reorganization cases noted above;44 and
the distinction was pointed between a stock dividend which con-
ferred "no different rights or interests than did the old,-the
new certificates plus the old, representing the same proportion-
ate interest in the net assets of the corporation as did the old,
** *'" and one which gave the stockholder "an interest different
from that which his former stock holdings represented * * *."4
The latter is taxable. The language of this opinion has been em-
bodied verbatim in the Regulations applicable to the dividends
paid credit provisions of the Act.4 6 It is perhaps chiefly with
this decision in mind that the Act and Regulations provide in
general terms for credits equal to taxable dividends distributed
by a corporation. We can now examine some of the alternatives
open to the corporate taxpayer in the light of this constitutional
background.
1. Common on Common
It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that this most convenient
and frequently employed form of dividend can, under the deci-
sions, afford no basis for a dividends paid credit. The ruling of
Eisner v. Macomber as applied to such distributions stands for-
tified by the distinctions made by the Court in Koshland v. Hel-
vering.4T For the purposes of this tax, it is unfortunate that the
inexorabilities of constitutional law foreclose a type of dividend
which in most cases would create less difficulties in corporate
financial structure than those to which, under present circum-
stances, the corporate taxpayer will be compelled to resort.
43. 80 L. ed. 845, at 847.
44. Ibid. at 847.
45. Ibid. at 847, 848.
46. Art. 115-3.
47. "Under our decisions the payment of a dividend of new common
shares, conferring no different rights or interests than did the old * * *
does not constitute the receipt of income by the stockholder." Koshland v.
Hehering, 80 L. ed. 845, at 847.
1936]
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2. Common Stock Solely Outstanding, Preferred
Declared as Dividend
Where the sole stock outstanding is common and it is proposed
to create and issue as dividends upon the common a preferred
issue, it is by no means certain that this constitutes distribution
taxable to the recipient. A long line of Board decisions, tacitly
assuming that such were nontaxable, appears of little value in
light of the misapprehension of Eisner v. Macomber until re-
cently held by the Treasury Department and lower courts.43 They
acquire a reflected importance, however, from a recent decision
which held that a preferred dividend upon common is taxable
where both common and preferred were at the time outstanding,
and which distinguished these prior holdings on the ground that
they involved situations where only common was outstanding at
the time of the preferred dividend.4' It is also significant that
the Regulations to the 1936 Act give as an example of a taxable
distribution the declaring of a preferred dividend on common
where both common and preferred are outstanding.50 The omis-
sion of our present situation may at least indicate doubt. On the
other hand, if the broad dictum that Eisner v. Macomber affected
only "the taxation of dividends declared in the same stock as
that presently held by the taxpayer" 1 is to be carried to its lin-
guistic conclusion, there would be justification for including our
present type of distribution among the list of dividends taxable
to their recipient. However, it is submitted that this dictum
should be qualified by the further distinctions drawn by the
Court between dividends which work a change in the proportion-
ate interest of the stockholder and those which do not.
Upon this basis it may be reasoned that a common stockholder
who receives a preferred dividend, retains the same proportion-
ate interest in the corporation as before; his right to receive di-
vidends remains in the same proportion as before; the fact that
a portion of his share is to be paid upon his preferred stock does
48. Commissioner v. Brown, 69 F (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 7, 1934); Alfred
A. Laun, 26 B. T. A. 764 (1932) ; Gertrude B. May, 26 B. T. A. 1413 (1932) ;
Louis Rorimer, 27 B. T. A. 871 (1933); T. Pierre Champion, 27 B. T. A.
1312 (1933) ; Annie Watts Hill, 27 B. T. A. 72 (1932) ; and consult note 35,
supra.
49. H. C. Gowran, 32 B. T. A. 820 (1935).
50. Art. 115-3, example (3).
51. Koshland v. Helvering, 80 L. Ed. 845, at 847 (1936).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/3
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX
not alter the percentage of corporate income flowing to him; his
voting rights remain the same, as does his right to participate in
the assets upon dissolution. In answer it has been urged that,
granting that prior to the issuance of preferred the stockholders
acting in unison had precisely the same rights which they now
enjoy separately as preferred shareholders, nevertheless, after
the distribution each shareholder possesses certain preferred
preferences regardless of the action of the other shareholders,
whereas formerly he only possessed these in unison with his feI-
lows.12 The difficulty with this argument is that it proves too
much; for similar reasoning might be applied to the receipt of
common stock by a common shareholder
Obviously, therefore, a distribution, the unsolved nature of
which depends upon the subtleties of constitutional dialectics,
cannot serve as a practical implement upon which a corporate
taxpayer desiring a dividend paid credit can rely.
A corporation which desires to issue a stock dividend, and
which has only common outstanding, must take care to avoid a
distribution subject to the pitfalls inherent in the type here dis-
cussed. An awareness of this difficulty is displayed in the plan
early adopted by the Caterpillar Tractor Company, which has
outstanding only common shares.54 Preferred is to be created,
and an option (of a sort to be discussed hereafter) given the com-
mon shareholders to obtain either cash or the new preferred as
a dividend. When, by this method, a portion of the preferred
has become outstanding, the corporation will pay the remainder
of the earnings on which it desires a dividends paid credit in the
form of a second dividend, this time solely in the preferred issue.
It would appear expedient for a corporation, which is similarly
circumstanced and which desires to issue preferred dividends,
to take these two steps. As will appear hereafter, a dividends
paid credit would result merely from the cash option offered by
Caterpillar Tractor. A corporation desiring, however, to insure
retention of the major part of the cash earnings will do well to
52. Magill, Taxable Income (1936) at 48.
53. So reasoned Judge Hand in Towne v. Eisner, 242 Fed. 702, 708 (D. C.
S. D. N. Y., 1917): "the stockholder has received new shares, 'epresenting
a permanent interest in the company, not subject to abatement by dividend
distributions which have a value capable of realization in cash."
54. 143 Comm. & Fin. Chron. 2201, 2669.
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use the cash option only as a means to pave the way toward a
larger dividend entirely in stock, as was done in this case.t1
3. Common and Preferred Outstanding, Preferred
Declared as a Dividend on Common
This distribution more evidently alters the proportionate inter-
ests of the shareholders by bettering the common shareholder at
the expense of the existing holders of preferred. The old prefer-
ential interests are spread thinner; the common shareholder by
becoming the holder of preferred, encroaches upon the priority
of the older preferred. Conversely the common now has a larger
amount of preferred outstanding ahead of it. This conclusion
finds support in recent Board decisions"6 and is further approved
by the Regulations to the 1936 Act which give the above distri-
bution as an example of one entitling the corporation to a divi-
dends paid creditY
Despite occasional dissent, 8 this type of distribution seems to
afford a safe and practical means of securing a dividends paid
credit. There are indications that it will receive widespread at-
tention from corporations seeking nontaxable methods of retain-
ing their current earnings in cash."
4. Preferred Receives Common Dividend
The taxability of this distribution has been directly ruled upon
and sanctioned by Koshland v. Helvering 0
5. Preferred Receives Preferred Dividends
This alters the proportionate status of the preferred stock-
holder by securing to him an extension of his priority at the
expense of the common shares. Although direct adjudications
are wanting, it appears to come safely within the rule of Kosh-
55. Even here, however, there exists a possible danger that the two steps
might be regarded as mere incidents in a single transaction whereby the
holders of common in effect receive dividends in preferred stock. This ig-
noring of intermediate steps is characteristic of the treatment of reorgani-
zation plans by the taxing authorities. See West Texas Refining Co. v. Com-
missioner, 68 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 10, 1933).
56. H. C. Gowran, 32 B. T. A. 820 (1935); James H. Torrens, 31 B. T.
A. 787 (1934) ; and see Annie M. Pfeiffer, Docket No. 82616 (Memo B. T. A.
decision).
57. Art. 115-3, example (3).
58. See dissent in H. C. Gowran, 32 B. T. A. 820, at 831 (1935).
59. Supra, notes 31 and 54.
60. Supra, note 42.
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land v. Helvering.61 From the point of view of conservative cor-
porate finance, it will probably in most cases be more desirable
to satisfy preferred dividend requirements by common rather
than preferred shares. On the other hand, inasmuch as in most
cases the payment of a stock dividend depends upon the volun-
tary acceptance of such in lieu of cash by the preferred holders,
a dividend in preferred stock may be more readily absorbed by
such shareholders. A corporation which in any event intends to
issue and distribute preferred shares to its common stockholders
may find it convenient to use the same issue for preferred hold-
ers. It is believed that such a distribution would be taxable to
both classes of recipients. 2 Any doubts as to such could be re-
moved by creating, where possible, a preferred of a different
degree of preference or priority from that outstanding.6 3 Con-
sequently, this type may receive some attention from corpora-
tions thus situated.
6. Dividends in Treasury Stock
Care must be used in interpreting the portion of the Act and
regulations dealing with this subject. The Act specifically in-
cludes among "dividends in kind" the distribution of "stock of
the corporation if held by the corporation as an investment." 64
The Regulations add that "Unless shown to the contrary, shares
of capital stock once issued but thereafter acquired by the cor-
poration in any manner whatsoever, but not retired, shall be
deemed to be held by the corporation as an investment. ' 65 The
context makes it clear that the purpose is not so much to indi-
cate that all such distributions entitle the corporation to a divi-
dends paid credit, as to fix the basis to be used in the computa-
tion of the credit, in the event that a treasury stock dividend is
given this effect.
There appears little reason to support a distinction between
the alteration in the proportionate interests of a stockholder
wrought by the receipt of a dividend from treasury stock and that
61. Supra, note 42; and consult Magill, Taxable Income (1936) at 48.
62. For even though common and preferred stockholders receive divi-
dends in the same stock medium, the relative priorities of the preferred and
common holder in the usual case will be to some degree altered.
63. See Marr v. United States, 268 U. S. 536, 45 S. Ct. 575, 69 L. ed.
1079 (1925).
64. Sec. 27(c).
65. Art. 27-3.
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wrought by the receipt of stock never hitherto outstanding. The
fact that existing shareholders are generally held to possess no
right of preemption as to treasury shares does not seem a suffi-
cient peg upon which to hang a. separate treatment of distribu-
tions of such stock.66 It may be concluded that a stock dividend
of a type non-taxable to the recipient will not be made taxable
by the mere fact that it has been declared out of treasury stock.
This conclusion has judicial support.6 7
7. Miscellaneous Types
The preceding discussion, for purposes of simplicity, has for
the most part assumed a clear-cut dichotomy of stock issues into
common and preferred. Actually, however, the picture is com-
plicated by the existence of various classes of common and vari-
ous degrees of preference and priority among the preferred.
These hybrid issues, however, in general do not constitute a sepa-
rate problem, but may be fitted into the categories already con-
structed in outline.6 8
B. Stock Rights
For the purpose of dividends paid credits, the distribution
of stock rights, insofar as such rights possess a market value,
should receive the same treatment as that which would be ac-
corded the actual distribution of the shares into which the rights
are convertible. This, in effect, has been the holding of the cases
involving the question.69
66. See Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F. (2d) 143, 147 (C. C. A. 2,
1925); Levy, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock (1930) 15 Minn.
L. Rev. 1; Frey, Shareholders' Preemptive Rights (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 563.
67. I. T. 2449, VIII-1 C. B. 101; James Kay, 28 B. T. A. 331 (1933);
J. S. Hatcher, 18 B. T. A. 632 (1930), Acq. IX, 2 C. B. 25. But see Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. at 228 (1920).
68. Consult also note 21, supra. By substituting these abnormal restricted
and preferential issues for the usual type of preferred, generally the same
results will be obtained in the equations we have constructed between pre-
ferred and common and preferred and preferred. And see p. - supra.
69. Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U. S. 247, 42 S. Ct. 483, 66 L.
ed. 923 (1922) ; Board v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 6, 1931) ;
Moran v. Lucas, 36 F. (2d) 546 (D. C. App., 1929); Metcalf's Estate v.
Commissioner, 32 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A. 2, 1929).
The entire .subject of stock rights, however, should be approached with
caution. It will be remembered that the Treasury Department in its former
rulings did not follow the method of computation approved in Miles v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., supra. See Reg. 86, Art. 22(a)-8; and consult Mont-
gomery, Federal Tax Handbook: 1934-35, at 197. The law has since been
changed; see sec. 27(e) ; 115 (f) (2), but the corresponding Regulations un-
der the new law are not yet available.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/3
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX
More doubt surrounds the issuance of rights to convertible
bonds. In one instance the holder of common stock was given
the right to purchase bonds convertible into common, at his op-
tion, on or after a certain date in the future. At the time of the
issuance of the right the stock of the company possessed market
value so far in excess of the valuation at which the bonds were
convertible as to render the rights of value. It was held that the
distributee could not be taxed upon the receipt of these rights;
it was reasoned that insofar as the rights possessed a market
value it was because of the conversion features of the bonds, a
fact which led the Board to treat the situation as one analogous
to a non-taxable stock dividend.7 0 However debatable the logic
behind these holdings, it will be well for a corporation seeking
dividends paid credits to avoid distributions leading to such
dialectical entanglements.
C. Dividends in Kind, in Obligations of the Corporation, in Cash
In this category are embraced a wide group of distributions,
the taxability of which, as income to the distributee, is subject to
little or no constitutional inhibitions. The Act and Regulations
make abundant provision for such as dividends paid credits.7'1
It was early decided that the declaration of a cash dividend out of
earnings and profits, however extraordinary in amount, consti-
tuted income to the shareholder.72 Before Eisner v. Macomber,
the Supreme Court made a similar ruling as to a dividend de-
clared in the stock of another corporation ;73 such was held equiv-
alent to a distribution in specie ;74 so with securities held in the
corporate treasury ;7 so with accounts receivable ;76 so with assets
70. T. I. Hare Powel, 27 B. T. A. 55 (1932) Acq. XIII-2 C. B. 15; Robert
C. Cooley, 27 B. T. A. 986 (1933).
71. Sec. 27(a); (c); (d): Art. 27-3; 27-4.
72. See Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, 38 S. Ct. 543, 62 L. ed. 1149
(1918).
73. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347, 38 S. Ct. 546, 62 L. ed. 1152 (1918).
74. Ibid.
75. Arthur Curtis James, 13 B. T. A. 764 (1928); Henry L. Erlewine, 19
B. T. A. 253 (1930).
76. Deposit Trust & Savings Bank, exe'r., 11 B. T. A. 706 (1928); and
see Duffin v. Lucas, 55 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 6, 1932), cert. den. 287 U. S.
611 (1932). So with forgiveness of a debt due corporation from stockholder.
J. E. Brading, 17 B. T. A. 436 (1929); Fitch v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d)
583 (C. C. A. 8, 1934) ; but contra, where the transaction can be shown to
be an integral part of a non taxable stock dividend plan. Teehan v. United
States, 25 F. (2d) 884 (D. C. D. Mass., 1928). In the latter case stock was
distributed in return for a note executed by the stockholder; later a dlvi-
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of a tangible nature.7 7 In all these cases there is a severance of
assets from the declaring corporation sufficient to meet the first
test of Eisner v. Macomber.78 So the distribution of a promise to
pay on the part of the corporation not only severs assets but re-
sults in an alteration of the proportionate interests of the stock-
holder.7 9 On principle, a bond dividend should not lose its tax-
ability to the recipient by the presence of a stock conversion
right unless a portion of the value of the bond is ascribable to
a right of conversion into a stock which would constitute a non-
taxable stock dividend.8 0
The issuance of bond dividends in many cases may prove an
excellent policy on the part of a corporate taxpayer which desires
to retain its cash earnings and yet is unable, or unwilling, to
increase its capitalization at the present time. It possesses the
added factor of greater predictability as to the credit allowable,
for the market value of such an obligation (if it be above par)
may be better ascertained in advance than that of a stock issue,
particularly in the case of a corporation, the securities of which
are infrequently traded in.81 These advantages, however, may be
counterbalanced where, as in states such as Missouri, there exist
ad valorem property taxes applicable to bonds, but not to stocks.8 2
This may cause a decided preference on the part of the corpora-
tion's stockholders for a stock distribution.
D. Cash Options
This method of securing a dividends paid credit will commend
itself to many taxpayers as an orthodox form of corporate dis-
dent was declared and credited to the stockholder as part payment of his
note. He was held not to have received taxable income.
77. Castle, 9 B. T. A. 931 (1927).
78. Supra, note 32.
79. United States v. Fuller, 42 F. (2d) 471 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1930);
Doerschuck v. United States, 274 Fed. 739 (D. C. E. D. N. Y., 1921).
80. For the legal status of convertible bonds see Berle, Convertible Bonds
and Stock Purchase Warrants (1926) 36 Yale L. J. 649, at 657. But see
note 70, supra, for treatment of rights to purchase bonds convertible into
stock which, if distributed, would be non taxable. At the very least, how-
ever, it would seem that a partial credit should be obtainable in such a case.
See sec. 27(h) ("If any part * * * is not a taxable dividend * * * no * * *
credit shall be allowed with respect to such part.). It remains to be seen,
however, whether the Treasury Department will so hold. In the meantime
such distributions should be avoided.
81. Consult infra, p. 29.
82. See Neuhoff, Missouri Property Taxes and the Merchants' and Manu-
facturers' License (1929) 14 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 157.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/3
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX
tributions which will require less departure from traditional
policies than some of the stock dividends discussed above. At
the same time, the form and circumstances under which such an
option is given demand equally careful attention if the distribu-
tion is to be taxable to the recipient. The Act, in a manner char-
acteristic of its policy of encouraging dividend disbursements,
defines cash options liberally:
Whenever a distribution by a corporation is, at the elec-
tion of any of the shareholders (whether exercised before or
after the declaration thereof), payable either (A) in its
stock or in rights to acquire its stock, of a class which, if dis-
tributed without election would be exempt from tax under
paragraph (1),* or (B) in money or any other property (in-
cluding its stock or rights to acquire its stock, of a class
which if distributed without election would not be exempt
from tax under paragraph (1), then the distribution shall
constitute a taxable dividend in the hands of all shareholders,
regafdless of the medium in which paid.8 3
The Regulations further liberalize the formula by providing
that the option may not only be exercised but exercisable before
the declaration, and that the declaration may provide for pay-
ment in one medium with the burden on the stockholder to re-
quest payment in a different medium. 4
This formula represents an appreciable step beyond prior
Treasury rulings and Court decisions. In charting a plan of cor-
porate action under it, the following judicial and administrative
history becomes of first importance. In Eisner v. Macomber oc-
curred dicta to the effect that "An actual cash dividend, with a
real option to the stockholder either to keep the money for his
own or to reinvest it in new shares, would be as far removed as
possible from a true stock dividend * * *."SS Accordingly, a num-
ber of Board and lower court decisions have held that where
there is a declaration of an actual cash dividend and the stock-
holder voluntarily applies this to the purchase of stock, he is
taxable as upon the receipt of a cash disbursement.8  It is im-
* i. e. not taxable income to the recipient.
83. Sec. 115(f) (2).
84. Art. 115-4.
85. 252 U. S. 189, at 215 (1920).
86. Lonsdale v. Commissioner, 32 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 8, 1929), cert.
den. 280 U. S. 575 (1929). (This case might have been decided on other
grounds, i. e. that in any event the stock disbursed was of a taxable na-
ture) ; Luthe Hardware Co., 6 B. T. A. 53 (1927); J. W. Hunt, 5 B. T. A.
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portant to note, however, that in most of these cases the actual
mechanics not only of a cash declaration, but also of a cash
distribution were performed . Treasury rulings were early
adopted to the effect that in order to render the transaction tax-
able to one who took stock there must have been at some time
during the proceedings an actual declaration of a cash dil)idend
in his favor which created the relationship of creditor and debtor
between the corporation and the shareholder. Thus if a dividend
were declared payable in stock unless by a certain date share-
holders filed notice of election to take cash, it was held that a
shareholder who elected to take stock was not taxable on its re-
ceipt because not until the record date did the right to receive
cash dividends become fixed, and consequently, the stockholder
who elected to take stock never acquired the status of a creditor
of the declarant corporation." The present Act attempts to dis-
pense with this unduly technical requirement that a dividend in
cash be at one time unconditionally declared in favor of the
shareholder before his election to take stock can become taxable.
Instead, it is provided that the option may be exercised not only
after but before the declaration,89 and that the recipient is taxed
whether he elects the medium of cash or stock. The Regulations
add the term "exercisable" evidently intending to cover the sit-
uation where the resolution provides that the dividend is to be
payable in one medium unless before a certain date, stockholders
notify of an election to take another form of distribution-a
methodt which, if safe, would be of great practical advantage to
a corporation desiring to increase its chances of retaining cash
by declaring a dividend in stock and putting on the shareholders
an affirmative burden to notify it of an election to take cash. 0
356 (1926); Eugene E. Paul, 2 B. T. A. 150 (1925); Amy H. Crellin, 12
B. T. A. 234 (1928), but see Crellin v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 650 (C. C.
A. 3, 1931) holding that under the facts no right to receive cash existed.
87. Supra, note 86.
8B. G. C. M. 6709, C. B. Dec. 1929, p. 132; and see IX-1 C. B. p. 144.
89. Sec. 115 (f) (2). Since under the wording of the section an option is
good if exercised before the declaration, a fortiori it would be good if elected
after the declaration but before the books were closed. Thus the Regulations
requiring an unconditional declaration in cash in favor of the shareholder
are obviously overruled. It is difficult, however, to understand how an option
can be exercised before a declaration. An option exercised before it is
granted is a novelty. Might it occur where the shareholders made an offer
to the corporation? And consult note 102 infra.
90. Until there appears further justification for the term "exercisable,'"
as used by the Regulations, great caution should be used in this matter.
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This action of the 1936 law in dispensing with the earlier re-
quirements that a technical cash dividend be declared and pay-
able to the recipient and by him used to purchase stock, and sub-
stituting the simpler formula that the shareholder need be given
merely an option as to which he will take, would appear to be
justified by three lines of reasoning. In the first place it might
be argued that this is in effect a stenographic way of performing
the same operation which was done in a more circuitous manner
in the old form as sanctioned by Eisner v. Macomber.91 Again,
where in fact some shareholders take cash, the proportionate
interests of the stockholders appear to be altered.92 And even
where all take stock, the option to take cash conceivably might
be regarded as a constructive severing of corporate assets-
although it must be confessed that in this case the argument for
severance can be made more effectively where the debtor-creditor
relationship at one stage of the proceedings actually existed.
Until the matter has been clarified, however, it will be best for
a corporation, which believes that the majority of its sharehold-
ers will select stock, to follow the older formula and declare an
unconditional cash dividend, attaching thereto the right to apply
such to the purchase of stock; for there exists the possibility that
in such a situation the proportionate interests of the stockhold-
ers would not be sufficiently altered to justify regarding the dis-
tribution as taxable to the recipients where a mere option was
offered . 3
Some evidence that the framers of this section relied chiefly for
its justification upon the element of disturbance of proportion-
ate interests may be afforded by the provision making the option
operative if given to "any of the shareholders."9 4 An option thus
given to only a portion of common stockholders would obviously
upset proportionate interests. However, such a procedure should
be adopted with grave caution; for, even if the term "any" is
used in a distributive sense, there is the probability that the
91. Supra, note 85.
92. Joseph Paper, 29 B. T. A. 523 (1933). The earlier cases appear ob-
livious of the change in proportionate interests affected even where no true
cash option existed; this may. be because of the fact that where concerted
plans to take stock existed there was very little change in proportionate in-
terests-almost none took cash. Consult note 96, infra.
93. i. e. in the event all chose stock.
94. Sec. 115(f) (2).
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clause is nullified by the controlling clause in Sec. 27 (g) which
declares that no dividends paid credit shall be allowable in cases
where one shareholder is given a preference over another of the
same class.95
Whether the corporation adopts the older plan of declaring
an outright cash dividend, or creates an option under the terms
of the 1936 Act, it is equally important that the shareholders be
given an actual and bona fide opportunity to secure the cash or
other taxable medium. It is possible to specify certain pitfalls
which, on the basis of existing decisions, should be avoided.
Where a cash declaration is made in accordance with an actual
agreement between the shareholders and the corporation that
the cash dividend is purely a matter of form and that stock will
in fact be received, it has with some qualifications been held that
the transaction amounts to a pure stock dividend."0 And the
fact that it may have been legally impossible for a corporation
validly to have issued a pure stock dividend will not necessarily
alter the case.97 Where at the date of declaration the corporation
was not possessed of sufficient cash earnings to discharge a cash
dividend obligation, it has frequently been decided that a stock
rather than a bona fide cash distribution was intended. 8 Accord-
ingly, a corporation desiring to receive credit under the option
formula cannot afford to rely upon having merely sufficient cash
or liquid assets to pay a predictible percentage of shareholders
desiring cash. Unless it is possessed of sufficient to pay all in
cash there exists some possibility, however, slight, of the trans-
action's being considered suspect under the above decisions. It
will be prudent to have at least borrowed cash on hand for the
duration of the option. The same considerations of course apply
95. One authority, consulted privately, has expressed the opinion that an
option given to some but not to all the stockholders of the same class would
probably constitute a "preference" within the meaning of sec. 27 (g).
96. United States v. Mellon, 281 Fed. 6,45 (C. C. A. 3, 1922); United
States v. Davison, 1 F. (2d) 465 (D. C. W. D. Pa., 1924) (really transac-
tions involving refinancing operations); Irving v. United States, 44 F. (2d)
246 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Deitz v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 944 (D. C. S. D. W.
Va. 1933); Theresa Zellerback, 2 B. T. A. 1076 (1925).
97. B. R. Norvell, 6 B. T. A. 56 (1927); W. C. Weiss, 7 B. T. A. 467
(1927).
98. Crellin v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 650 (C. C. A. 3, 1931); Irving v.
United States, 44 F. (2d) 246 (Ct. Cl. 1930); United States v. Mellon, 281
Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 3, 1922) ; United States v. Davison, 1 F. (2d) 465 (D. C.
W. D. Pa. 1924).
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in the case of such options to receive distributions in kind or
in taxable stock as, for the purposes of the formula, are equiva-
lent to cash.9 Likewise, should be avoided a cash option the com-
ing into effect of which is conditioned upon a certain percentage
of the shareholders' consenting to accept, or subscribe to, new
stock. Although there is some apparent support to the propo-
sition that such constitutes a bona fide option,100 it is believed
that in effect this is no option at all.1' 1 Insofar as the 1936 Act
seems to sanction such a procedure as constituting an option it
should be regarded as suspect.10' Although the plan may appeal
to a corporation desirous of ensuring that it will in no event
have to distribute more than a certain percentage of cash divi-
dends, such benefits are more than authorized by its potential
hazards.
Although there appears no objection to weighting an option
in favor of the stock, it is possible that an extreme disparity be-
tween the value of the stock and the cash offering might be re-
garded as destructive of the bona fide optional nature of the
transaction. 0'
E. Distributions in Liquidation
The subject of corporate liquidations and reorganizations in-
volves matters of too broad a scope to permit of inclusion in
this article. It is, however, proposed to outline briefly the prob-
lems of interpretation inherent in this section of the Act.
The provision dealing with this complex subject is so succinct
as to create serious exegetical problems:
In the case of amounts distributed in liquidation the part
of such distribution which is properly chargeable to the earn-
ings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, shall,for the purposes of computing the dividends paid credit un-
der this section, be treated as a taxable dividend paid.104
99. See sec. 115 (f) (2).
100. Lonsdale v. Commissioner, 32 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 8, 1929); cert.
den. 280 U. S. 575 (1929), held such a plan to result in a taxable dividend.
It has been remarked, however, that this case involved the issuance of a
type of stock probably taxable in its own right, regardless of the supposed
option. Mrs. Frank Andrews, 26 B. T. A. 642 (1932).
101. See George T. Smith, 21 B. T. A. 782 (1930).
102. The provision that the option may be exercised before the declara-
tion might be construed to extend to such a case. Sec. 115 (f) (2).
103. Consult Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 44, citing Commissioners of
Inland Revenue v. Wright, 1 K. B. 333 (C. A., 1927).
104. Sec. 27(f).
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The definition of amounts properly chargeable to earnings and
surplus does not present great difficulty.105 More troublesome is
the attempt on the part of the Regulations to confine the scope
of this section to cases where under Sec. 115 (c) the amounts
distributed in liquidation are treated as received in payment for
the stock, and under Sec. 112 of the Act the gain or loss, if any,
from such an exchange is recognized. 10  By this interpretation
the dividends paid credit is made to apply only to cases where
the transferee in liquidation is immediately taxable in the event
the transaction results in a gain to him. 07 Such an interpreta-
tion would exclude from the dividends paid credit many corpo-
rate reorganizations and such attractive and, for tax purposes,
desirable expedients as the liquidation of subsidiaries into par-
ent companies. 08 It may be, however, that the Regulations do
not intend to exclude the situations under See. 112 where gains
as to certain parts of non-taxable reorganizations are rendered
taxable.00 The reasoning assigned by the Regulations is that,
first, "certain transactions described in Sec. 112 and 115 of the
Act are treated for the purposes of the Act, not as distributions
to the shareholders of earnings or profits, but as transfers of
such earnings or profits intact to another corporation in whose
hands such earnings or profits, being available for distribution
by it as dividends to its shareholders, have essentially the same
status for the purposes of the Act as earnings or profits derived
from its own operations"; and, second, "Characteristic of these
transactions is the circumstance that the gain or loss realized
from the receipt by the shareholders of property is not recog-
nized by the Act."" 0 In answer to the first argument it may be
observed that the dividends paid credit section does not demand
that the transaction be one "treated for the purposes of the Act
* * * as distributions to the shareholders of earnings or profits,"
but merely states that such part of the liquidation which is
chargeable to earnings and profits be treated as a taxable divi-
105. Art. 27-6(b).
106. Art. 27-6(a).
107. Ibid.
108. Secs. 112(b) (3); (4); (5); (6).
109. See see. 112(c) (1), (2); compare with see. 27(h) which refuses a
dividend paid credit to the "part" of a distribution which is not a taxable
dividend to the distributee.
110. Art. 27-6(a).
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dend paid-the section merely sets a basis of computation as to
amount. The second reason is indubitably, (and inconclusively)
debatable. Should Sec. 27(f) be considered modified by Sec.
27(h) which disallows dividend paid credits in the case of dis-
tributions which do not constitute taxable dividends to the reci-
pient, or shall Sec. 27(f) which has reference to a particular
situation, control over the more general section? Arguments of
policy assist little. On the one hand it may be considered that
the provision was intended to facilitate reorganizations and liqui-
dations and consequently that the dividends paid credit applies
to all such transactions regardless of whether taxable to the dis-
tributee. On the other hand if such non-taxable transfers are
given credit a fertile field will be opened for easy evasion of the
undistributed profits tax.
Assuming for the moment that the Regulations correctly inter-
pret the law, and that a corporation possessing undistributed
earnings for the current year liquidates into a parent company,
the further problem is presented as to whether the parent com-
pany is liable for the undistributed profits tax upon the earnings
of the subsidiary, which retain their character as such in the
transferee's hands.11 It would seem that, inasmuch as the trans-
fer does not constitute income to the transferee the latter would
not come within the provisions of the surtax. Under this inter-
pretation, however, a transferor which had not distributed its
earnings in advance of the transaction would be compelled to pay
a tax. The harshness of this ruling is: partially ameliorated by
the further ruling that, subject to the approval of the Commis-
sioner, a transferor and transferee corporation may agree to
allocate a portion of the dividends subsequently paid by the latter
in the taxable year to the former's use in computing dividends
paid credit. 1 2 This ruling, however, is a gratuitous undertaking
on the part of the Department, and in view of the dubious dia-
lectic state of the Treasury interpretations, as well as of the un-
predictable discretion invested in the Commissioner's hands, it
would seem only prudent for the corporate taxpayer to place
little reliance upon the obtaining of such an allocation, but rather
to protect itself by making distributions in advance of the liqui-
dation.
111. See Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 2, 1932);
and Seidman, Undistributed Profits Tax Problems (1936) 14 T. M. 453 ff.
112. Art. 27-6(c).
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It is perhaps apparent that the provisions herein discussed at
present represent an uncharted sea, into which a corporate tax-
payer should only venture where necessity, or the lack of a safer
means of obtaining a dividends paid credit so impel. For the
latter purpose it may prove in some cases useful. 18
F. Dividends Defined
Prior to 1936 a dividend, for the purposes of the Act, was
simply defined as "any distribution made by a corporation to its
shareholders, whether in money or in other property, out of its
earnings or profits accumulated after February 25, 1913."114 The
present Act adds:
"or (2) out of the earnings and profits of the taxable year(computed as of the close of the taxable year without dimi-
nution by reason of any distributions made during the tax-
able year), without regard to the amount of the earnings
and profits at the time the distribution was made.11
The new clause serves to clarify the position of a corporation
which begins a taxable year with no accumulated earnings on
hand from prior years, or, indeed, with a deficit, and which
makes dividend disbursements out of sources which at the time
are not earnings and profits. These disbursements will be con-
sidered taxable dividends to the recipient, and the corporation
accordingly will be given a "dividends paid credit' therefor to
the extent that they are covered by the actual earnings, if any,
which the corporation may realize by the end of the year. A cor-
poration seeking "dividends paid credit" thus will be relieved
from the necessity of showing that at the time of each distribu-
tion there actually existed earnings and profits accumulated
since February 28, 1913.110
G. Preferences
No dividends paid credit is allowable for any distribution
which is not "pro rata, equal in amount, and with no preference
to any share of stock as compared with other shares of the same
class.'' T The Regulations appear properly to construe the sec-
113. Supra, p. 7.
114. Sec. 115(a).
115. Ibid.
116. Art. 115-1. And see Report of Senate Committee on Finance on H.
R. 12395, 74th. Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) at p. 18.
117. Sec. 27(g).
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tion as extending to distributions "regardless of the medium in
which * * * made," thus including distributions in kind, in stock,
in obligations; distributions in liquidation also belong in its
scope. ' - It is also proper to conclude that the "disallowance of
the dividends paid credit, where any preference or inequality in
fact exists, extends to the entire amount of the distribution and
not merely to a part of such distribution." 119 This occurs regard-
less of the fact that the preference was created with the consent
of all shareholders and the amounts received by preferred stock-
holders were taxable to them as dividends.1 2 0
These provisions evidently are intended to inhibit a device
often employed by close corporations to prevent the very result
which the Act is intended to bring about-the receipt by large
shareholders of dividend disbursements which enlarge their per-
sonal income. It has been possible, with the consent of all share-
holders, to distribute the income of a closely held corporation,
not in accordance with the pro rata holdings of the members, but
to suit the exigencies of their personal income tax computations.
Since the present clause is thus peculiarly essential to the fur-
therance of the ultimate purpose of the Act, it will in all prob-
ability be strictly enforced. In this respect a corporate taxpayer
will do well to avoid the shadow of suspicion. Consequently, dis-
tributions in different media of equal value, although not ex-
pressly interdicted, should be avoided, for the danger exists that
a mistake in valuation might be held to give rise to a preference.
Thus where stockholders in the same class are given in some
cases, cash, and in other cases obligations of the corporation of
equal face value, there can be no positive assurance that the
market value of the obligations is equal to the cash received by
other shareholders. Where an option is given, of course, the ob-
jects of choice need not be equal.1 21
A recent ruling provides that where, in accordance with
"standard practice" in a stock distribution, fractional shares are
issued in the form of bearer scrip certificates not entitled to divi-
dends nor voting power until combined as a whole share, no
preference is created. The ruling also applies to the making of
118. Art. 27-7.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. But see note 103, supra.
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cash adjustments in the case of extremely small fractional
shares.'2
H. Date of Dividend Payment
The dividends paid credit is to apply only to such parts of a
distribution as are taxable in the hands of the shareholders "for
the period in which the distribution is made. '' 123 Further provi-
sions forbid use of the accrual method in computing dividends
paid credits.124 The Regulations, perhaps not unfairly, demand
that a corporation desiring a dividends paid credit for a parti-
cular year show actual receipt of the distribution by the share-
holder within that year.1 25 The mailing of a check, payable in
the current year, at such a time as ordinarily to reach the share-
holder during the taxable year creates a presumption of timely
payment.1 28
A corporation desiring to await the last moment before com-
puting its current earnings would do well to have its share-
holders appoint an agent authorized to receive disbursements.
The Regulations permitting the crediting of the accounts of the
shareholder to serve in place of direct payment are so restrict-
edly phrased as to render it prudent for a corporation actually
to issue obligations rather than rely upon a dubious permis-
sion.127 The shares of a stock dividend must be registered on the
corporate books in the shareholder's name within the current
year; delivery of the certificate constitutes prima facie evidence
of payment.128 Where the dividend is payable in obligations of
the corporation they should be entered or registered on the cor-
porate books within the taxable year and, in the case of bearer
obligations, should be actually received by the shareholder or his
transferee or nominee.12 9 Adequate records must be kept.130
122. 4 U. S. Law Week 17 (Oct. 27, 1936) reprinting I. T. Mimeograph
Coll. No. 4514 (Oct. 17, 1936). Incidentally, the fact that it was thought
necessary to explain that cash substitutes for fractional shares were not
preferential may indicate that payments in different media of equal market
value are normally considered preferential.
123. See. 27(h).
124. Sec. 43.
125. Art. 27-1(b).
126. Art. 27-1(b).
127. Ibid. And see Hendricks, The Surtax on Undistributed Profits of
Corporations (1936) 46 Yale L. J. 19, at 32, 33.
128. Art. 27-1(b).
129. Ibid.
130. Art. 27-1(c); (d).
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The corporate taxpayer thus unnecessarily, it would seem, is
placed in a dilemma in which it must attempt to avoid the Scylla
of a premature estimate of its current earnings and the Charyb-
dis of delaying its estimate until it is too late to distributions ac-
tually receivable within the alloted time. Any revision of the Act
could, without great difficulty, include a rectification of this
mechanical problem.1' 1 Some relief against an overly optimistic
estimate of current earnings is provided by a dividend carry
over mechanism. 132
L Computation of Credits
A further ingredient in any proposed plan of corporate con-
formance with the Act is introduced by the varying bases of
dividends paid credits. It is important to note that credits are
based, not upon the medium in which the dividend is declared,
but upon that in which it is actually "paid."' 13 Thus if a dividend
is declared in cash but satisfied in stock the latter will form the
basis of credit computations."4- For dividends paid in kind, in-
cluding treasury stock held as an investment, the corporate tax-
payer will receive a credit based upon either the "adjusted basis"
of the property in its hands, or the "fair market value" at the
time of payment-whichever is lower. 3 Distributions of obliga-
tions of the corporation receive credit equal to the lower of two
amounts-their par, or their fair market value at the time of
the payment.' 3; Stock rights and stock dividends are credited at
their "fair market value."137 It is believed that where a cash-
stock option is offered, the dividends paid credit in the case of
stock distributions would likewise be measured by their market
value.1-
The relative desirability of alternate methods of distribution
is thus conditioned by an additional factor. No general rule of
131. Graham, The Undistributed Profits Tax and the Investor (1936) 46
Yale L. J. 1, at 18, suggests that 25% of the total dividends paid credit be
allowed for distributions made within sixty days of the close of the taxable
year.
132. Sec. 27(b).
133. Sec. 27(c); (d); (e).
134. Art. 27-3.
135. Sec. 27(c) and Art. 27-3.
136. Sec. 27(d). Art. 27-4.
137. Sec. 27(e).
138. This would perhaps follow from the fact that the medium in which
the dividend is paid controls. Supra, note 133.
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behavior can be charted. In certain cases, however, obvious ad-
vantages can be obtained from careful attention to these varying
credits. Not least among the imponderables with which the cor-
porate plan must deal is the estimation of the value which will
be placed by the market upon its proposed issues.
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